Fitzgerald Eyes Plame-Niger Conspiracy
Prosecutor Probing Niger Forgeries, Possible Conspiracy in CIA Leak
By Jason Leopold / t r u t h o u t
"There was a discussion about what to do about Mr.
Wilson," the current State Department official said. "There was a
decision to leak a story to the press - I think a few journalists -
about the Wilson trip, that it was a non-issue because his wife set it
up for him."
Over the past few months, Special Prosecutor Patrick Fitzgerald has
been questioning witnesses in the CIA leak case about the origins of
the disputed Niger documents referenced in President Bush's January
2003 State of the Union address, according to several current and
former State Department officials who have testified in the case.
The State Department officials, who spoke on condition of
anonymity because some of the information they discussed is still
classified, indicated that the White House had substantial motive for
revealing undercover CIA operative Valerie Plame's identity to
reporters.
They said the questions Fitzgerald asked them about the Niger
documents suggested to them that the special prosecutor was putting
together a timeline. They said they believe Fitzgerald wants to show
the grand jury how some people in the Bush administration may have
conspired to retaliate against former Ambassador Joseph Wilson, an
outspoken critic of the administration's pre-war Iraq intelligence.
The officials said Fitzgerald's interest is not in the the
war's validity. Instead, Fitzgerald is trying to find out if Wilson's
public questions about the administration's intelligence and its use of
the Niger documents led members of a little known committee called the
White House Iraq Group to leak Plame's name and CIA status to
reporters.
The officials have provided the first in-depth look at how the
administration came to rely upon the Niger documents in the fall of
2002, and how it played a direct role in the Plame leak, which
ultimately forced the White House to acknowledge that it shouldn't have
allowed President Bush to cite the uranium claims in his State of the
Union address - a move the White House had hoped it could avoid.
Wilson was chosen by the CIA in February 2002 to travel to
Niger to check on questions Vice President Dick Cheney had about Iraq's
interest in buying yellowcake uranium from the African country. Uranium
is the key component used to build an atomic bomb. The State Department
had first expressed doubts about the vice president's inquiries.
Officials at the State Department, including Colin Powell, according to
sources, told Cheney the intelligence was suspect.
"We already expressed our opinion about the intelligence the
vice president was asking about. We thought it had no merit," one
former senior State Department official said. "We resented that they
didn't trust what we said."
Indeed, earlier that month, Carlton Fulford Jr., a four-star
Marine general, was sent to Niger to check on the security of Niger's
uranium. He returned to the United States convinced that the supply was
secure. Fulford informed Gen. Richard B. Myers, chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, about his findings. It's unclear whether Myers ever
shared the information with White House officials. A spokesperson for
Myers said the general would not respond to questions for this story.
Later that same month, the State Department official said,
Wilson traveled to Niger on behalf of the CIA. That's the trip the
State Department had initially protested because Fulford had already
looked into it. But Wilson confirmed that there was no truth to the
allegations.
"We felt vindicated," the State Department official said
because there had long been animosity between the White House and State
over disagreements concerning intelligence on the Iraqi threat.
However, seven months later, the British government prepared a
"white paper" giving validity to the claims that Iraq tried to purchase
uranium from Niger which the State Department and Wilson had already
proved false.
"Some very senior people in the vice president's office saw
that as an opportunity," an official who currently works at the State
Department in a senior capacity said. "They took it and ran with it,
and it was wrong."
I. Lewis "Scooter" Libby - Cheney's former chief of staff, who
was indicted on five-counts of lying to federal investigators, perjury,
and obstruction of justice related to his role in the Plame leak -
National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley, and Cheney had embraced the
uranium claims cited in the"white paper," according to the State
Department sources, and they had all pushed for its inclusion in the
National Intelligence Estimate in October 2002.
I have no idea how or why [the Niger uranium claim] got in
there," one of the current State Department sources said. "To this day
I don't know. Secretary Powell knew that we disagreed with the
intelligence. It wasn't that we disagreed with the White House per se.
It's that we disagreed with the intelligence regarding Niger. We were
the only people in the intelligence community who thought the documents
were bogus."
Numerous messages were left at the offices of Hadley, Cheney and Powell, and there was no response.
Iraq's interest in the yellowcake caught the attention of
Mohammed ElBaradei, the head of the International Atomic Energy
Association. ElBaradei had read a copy of the National Intelligence
Estimate and had personally contacted the State Department and the
National Security Council, where Hadley was then deputy advisor, to
obtain the evidence so his agency could look into it.
ElBaradei sent a letter to the White House and the National
Security Council in December 2002, warning senior officials he thought
the documents were forgeries and should not be cited by the
administration as evidence that Iraq was actively trying to obtain
WMDs. ElBaradei said he never received a written response to his
letter, despite repeated follow-up calls he made to the White House,
the NSC and the State Department.
The State Department officials said they did not know whether
Powell ever saw ElBaradei's letter, but they were unaware that
ElBaradei had inquired about the allegations made in the Niger
documents.
In a second letter sent to Congressman Henry Waxman,
D-California, in March 2003, after the Iraq had war started, ElBaradei
laid out the details of his attempts to get to the bottom of the Niger
uranium story.
ElBaradei said that when the Niger claims were included in the
State Department fact sheet on the Iraqi threat in December 2002, "the
IAEA asked the U.S. Government, through its Mission in Vienna, to
provide any actionable information that would allow it to follow up
with the countries involved, viz Niger and Iraq."
ElBaradei said he was assured that his letter was forwarded to
the White House and to the National Security Council. He added that he
and his staff were suspicious about the Niger documents because it had
long been rumored that documents pertaining to Iraq's attempt to obtain
uranium from Niger had been doctored.
In conversations and correspondence with Waxman in March 2003,
ElBaradei said White House officials pledged to cooperate with United
Nations inspectors but repeatedly withheld evidence from them.
Cheney, who made the rounds on the cable news shows that month,
tried to discredit ElBaradei's conclusion that the documents were
forged.
"I think Mr. ElBaradei frankly is wrong," Cheney said. "[The
IAEA] has consistently underestimated or missed what it was Saddam
Hussein was doing. I don't have any reason to believe they're any more
valid this time than they've been in the past."
Two months earlier, Wilson re-emerged. It was one day after
President Bush's January 28, 2003, State of the Union address, in which
the president said: "The British government has learned that Saddam
Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa."
Wilson said he met with a friend who worked at the State
Department and asked why the president cited the British intelligence
report about Iraq's attempt to buy uranium, when he had debunked the
allegation a year earlier.
"I reminded a friend at the State Department of my trip and
suggested that if the president had been referring to Niger, then his
conclusion was not borne out by the facts as I understood them. He
replied that perhaps the president was speaking about one of the other
three African countries that produce uranium: Gabon, South Africa or
Namibia. At the time, I accepted the explanation. I didn't know that in
December, a month before the president's address, the State Department
had published a fact sheet that mentioned the Niger case," Wilson wrote
in his infamous July 6, 2003, op-ed in the New York Times, which
preceded his wife's identity being leaked to reporters by about a week.
Many career State Department officials were also livid that the so-called "16 words"
made its way into the State of the Union address, the current and
former department officials who commented for this story said.
"To me it showed a total disregard for the truth, plain and
simple," said one former State Department official who had worked
closely with former Secretary of State Colin Powell, referring to the
administration's use of the flawed intelligence.
"I refuse to believe that the findings of a four-star general
and an envoy the CIA sent to Niger to personally investigate the
accuracy of the intelligence, as well as our own research at the State
Department, never got into the hands of President Bush or Vice
President Cheney. I don't buy it. Saying that Iraq sought uranium from
Niger was all it took, as far as I'm concerned, to convince the House
to support the war. The American people too. I believe removing Saddam
Hussein was right and just. But the intelligence that was used to state
the case wasn't."
The officials said Scooter Libby and Stephen Hadley had
pressured Powell to reference the Niger documents in his presentation
to the United Nations in February 2003, but Powell did not believe the
intelligence was solid and refused. The officials said there was a
verbal confrontation between the men over the issue. Other sources
close to Powell confirmed this as well.
Although there were suspicions that the Niger documents were
forgeries, the White House went to great lengths to defend its use of
the report in Bush's State of the Union address, saying the CIA signed
off on it.
At this time, Wilson was also unconvinced that the White House
did not see his report. In private conversations with a State
Department official and a few reporters, he accused the White House of
twisting the intelligence to fuel the administration's war machine. He
let it be known that he had personally investigated the allegations on
behalf of the CIA.
By May 2003, Wilson had made enough noise in Washington, DC,
political circles about the veracity of pre-war Iraq intelligence to
attract the attention of Libby and Hadley. Wilson had been a source for
Nicholas Kristoff's New York Times column that suggested the
administration knowingly used the phony Niger documents to win support
for the war.
"You have to understand," the former State Department official
said, "this was two months after the invasion, and here was a person
contradicting what the administration felt strongly about. The
administration put so much stock into the fact that WMDs (weapons of
mass destruction) were there. But it was clear that in May 2003 there
was no evidence of WMDs. Anyone bringing it up, calling the
administration out, so to speak, became a target."
All of the officials said that after Kristoff's column was
published, they received phone calls from from Libby and Hadley
inquiring about the unnamed official in Kristoff's column, who turned
out to be Wilson. For the first time, the public learned that the US
had sent an American envoy to personally check on the accuracy of the
Niger claims.
This was in stark contrast to what the administration had been
saying publicly up until this point: that they only cited the Niger
documents because they had been confirmed by British intelligence. But
the column raised new questions about what the administration knew and
when they knew it. The revelation in Kristoff's report threatened to
expose how senior White House officials ignored Wilson and all the
other warnings they had received about the veracity of the documents.
Cheney found out who Wilson was in May 2003, according to the
indictment handed up against Libby in late October. Cheney found out
that Wilson's wife worked at the CIA. He shared the information with
Libby, although Libby had been snooping around on his own and found out
the same information, too.
In fact, according to sources knowledgeable about the
discussions that took place during this time, only a handful of
Cheney's very close aides knew the identity of the person trashing the
administration's pre-war intelligence. Karl Rove wasn't even in the
know yet, the sources said.
White House officials' decision to retaliate against Wilson by
blowing his CIA wife's cover to reporters would come less than a month
later - in early June 2003.
The Wilson story had legs. Walter Pincus of the Washington Post
started poking around. He called the CIA to check on Wilson's story. He
called other people at the White House, too. Reporters were becoming
very interested in the fact that the Bush administration failed to
inform Congress or the public that Cheney asked the CIA to look into
the Niger uranium allegations a year before, and that Wilson was chosen
for the mission. It started to appear as if the administration had
manipulated the intelligence and duped Congress into backing the war.
Marc Grossman, then Undersecretary of State for Political
Affairs, read about the Niger story, and the unnamed special envoy that
was sent to check out the bogus claims, in Kristoff's column.
"He got a request from someone at the White House to look into
it, the Niger issues that is, and he asked INR about it," the current
State Department official said.
Grossman was scheduled to meet with Cheney and Libby and other
senior officials who were members of the White House Iraq Group to
discuss the war and the negative stories that were flooding the media
about the absence of WMDs in Iraq.
There is no indication that Fitzgerald is investigating Cheney.
The White House Iraq Group (WHIG) was formed in August 2002 by
Andrew Card, President Bush's chief of staff, to publicize the threat
posed by Saddam Hussein. WHIG operated out of the Vice President's
office.
The group's members included Rove, Bush advisor Karen Hughes,
Senior Advisor to the Vice President Mary Matalin, Deputy Director of
Communications James Wilkinson, Assistant to the President and
Legislative Liaison Nicholas Calio, Secretary of State Condoleezza
Rice, National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley and I. Lewis "Scooter"
Libby.
Last week, this State Department official said that a meeting
took place in the office of the Vice President after Libby read the
memo, to decide how they would respond to Wilson's increasing public
criticism about the administration.
"There was a major, major concern about the polls, the public
response, that Mr. Wilson could cause enormous damage," the retired
senior State Department official said.
Grossman asked Carl Ford, then the head of the State
Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, to prepare what is
known as an INR report about the Niger claims to shed additional light
on what Wilson had been referring to in news reports.
The four-page memo indicated that the State Department long had
doubts about the veracity of the administration's claims about Iraq's
attempts to purchase yellowcake uranium from Niger. The memo made scant
reference to Wilson and his wife, Valerie Plame.
"We had real qualms that the intel was not true. When the
report was prepared, we were actually happy, because it was an
opportunity to talk about Niger again and why we thought there was
absolutely no truth to the intelligence," one senior State Department
official who saw the report said. "It was not intended to be a report
about Mr. Wilson or Ms. Plame."
A retired State Department official who was a source for a July
20, 2005, Associated Press story told the AP that the memo was drafted
to respond to specific questions about Wilson's debunking of the Niger
uranium claims.
"It wasn't a Wilson-Wilson wife memo," the State Department
official told the AP. "It was a memo on uranium in Niger and focused
principally on our disagreement with the White House."
The retired official was tracked down and interviewed by this
reporter. This person said some senior members of Cheney's staff wanted
the memo "toned down" after they read it.
"Try to understand their concern," the retired State Department
official said. "This was the very first time there was written evidence
- not notes, but a request for a report - from the State Department
that documented why the Niger intel was bullshit. It was the only thing
in writing, and it had a certain value because it didn't come from the
IAEA. It came from State. It scared the heck out of a lot of people
because it proved that this guy Wilson's story was credible. I don't
think anybody wanted the media to know that the State Department
disagreed with the intelligence used by the White House. That's why
Wilson had to be shut down."
The current State Department official said the INR memo was
discussed at length during the meeting Grossman attended at the White
House. That meeting may have been the first time other White House
officials, including Karl Rove, White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card,
and other unknown administration officials learned that Valerie Plame
was Wilson's wife and that she worked at the CIA in a covert capacity.
All of the sources interviewed separately for this story said
they were told that Karl Rove was the person who first suggested using
the media to "turn the tables on Wilson." The officials wouldn't
identify the person who told them this. The decision, however, was made
during a meeting that took place between the White House Iraq Group.
"There was a discussion about what to do about Mr. Wilson," the
current State Department official said. "There was a decision to leak a
story to the press - I think a few journalists - about the Wilson trip,
that it was a non-issue because his wife set it up for him. They were
going to show that Wilson and his wife were Democrats. Can you imagine?
They were going to say 'don't listen to them, they're partisan.' It was
a coordinated effort to turn him into the story. Much to my surprise,
it worked."
One of the officials interviewed for this story was also cited
in a September 28, 2003, Washington Post story about the motivation to
leak Wilson's wife's identity to the media. "Clearly, it was meant
purely and simply for revenge," the State Department official told the
Post. The Post did not name the official.
Lawyers close to the leak case said Fitzgerald seems to be
pursuing conspiracy charges against some of the higher-profile suspects
in the leak, such as Rove.
Robert Luskin, Rove's attorney, did not return numerous
messages left at Patton Boggs, the law offices where he works in
Washington, DC.
The State Department officials said they were asked by
Fitzgerald how important they thought the Niger uranium claims were in
making a case for war. He also asked them why they doubted the
authenticity of the Niger documents, why the reports appeared to be
dubious, if they knew how Wilson was picked to investigate it, whether
they heard about his verbal report upon his return, how and why the INR
memo was prepared, and whether it was done in response to Wilson's
claims about the Niger intelligence or so officials could find out how
Wilson was chosen for the trip, and why any reference to his wife was
made in the memo.
Ironically, a day after Wilson's July 6, 2003, op-ed titled
"What I didn't Find in Niger" was published in the New York Times,
Hadley accepted responsibility for allowing the infamous "16 words"
to be included in Bush's State of the Union address. Hadley was sent
two separate letters from the CIA, warning him not to allow Bush to
cite the Niger uranium claim in his State of the Union address. Hadley
said he forgot about the letters.
Exactly one week later, Valerie Plame Wilson's cover was blown in a column written by conservative journalist Robert Novak.